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explaining observed and persistent differences in standards of living over time and across regions.
Focusing on fundamental rather than proximate influences, we find that both institutional
characteristics and some physical geography characteristics account for a high proportion of the
differences in state productivity levels: states with navigable waterways, a large minerals
endowment, and no slaves in 1860, on average, had higher labor productivity levels throughout the
sample period. However, we find little support for two other influences that have previously
received attention  n climate and latitude.
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A major issue in the literature on growth concerns the importance of institutional factors 
relative to geographical influences in determining why some countries are rich and others poor. 
Especially in studies that focus on the deeper rather than proximate sources of growth, debate 
has centered on whether a country’s economic fortune is locked in by physical features or 
whether institutional factors, often regarded as endogenous, influence its trajectory. As a 
complement to the long-standing interest of economic historians in these issues (North and 
Thomas, 1973, Jones, 1981, Rosenberg and Birdzell, 1986, Landes, 1998, and Pomeranz, 2000), 
recent studies by economists (Hall and Jones, 1996, 1999) have departed from the standard 
methodology of accounting for the variation in growth rates and instead focused attention on 
explaining variation in income or productivity levels across countries.
1  
Recently, the debate has been sharpened by attempts to marshal a wider range of data 
than typically used in the empirical growth literature, and assess directly the relative influence of 
institutions and geography – both broadly defined – in cross-country regressions. Several authors 
have stressed the geographical correlates of income per capita, such as latitude, the disease 
environment, access to navigable water, and distance from the principal centers of the world 
economies (Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger, 1999; Mellinger, Sachs, and Gallup, 1999). This 
approach has been advocated especially in attempts to account for the relatively poor recent 
performance of sub-Saharan economies (Bloom and Sachs, 1998).  However, Acemoglu, 
                                                           
1  For surveys of the empirical cross-country growth literature, nearly all of which examine growth rates rather than   2
Johnson, and Robinson (2001b) have argued that, although geographical attributes may appear 
correlated with economic performance, the more influential determinants are institutional in 
nature.
2 
This article provides a fresh empirical approach for assessing the relative importance of 
institutions versus geography in explaining differences in standards of living over time. We 
exploit the extraordinary range in productivity levels that existed across the U.S. states (Figure 
1) over the past century as well as the methodological advantages that result from examining the 
variation within a country rather than across countries to advance this debate. In 1880 the United 
States was poised to overtake Britain as the most efficient industrial economy, and become the 
century-long benchmark against which all other economies’ productivity performance would be 
compared. Yet in that year, labor productivity in the least productive state (North Carolina) was 
a mere 18 percent of that in the most productive (Nevada). Excluding the case of Nevada 
because of its early stage of settlement and very small population, a comparison with the second 
and third most productive states, California and New York, indicates North Carolina as being 
only 23.6 and 24.4 percent as productive, respectively.
3 Differences of such magnitude between 
countries would today only be found in comparisons between developed and developing 
economies.
4 Until 1940 this wide range of productivity levels narrowed only gradually, when the 
least productive state had a level of labor productivity 25 percent that of the most productive. 
Thereafter the gap narrowed more rapidly, with the least productive state reaching 61 percent of 
the level of the most productive in 1980. Just as the existence of large productivity gaps between 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
levels, see Temple (1999) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). 
2 For related discussion, see McArthur and Sachs (2001). 
3 This wide variation persists even when states are aggregated into regions. The South Atlantic region had a level of 
labor productivity only 38 per cent that of the Pacific region (Mitchener and McLean, 1999). 
4 For example, GDP per worker in both Morocco and Thailand was approximately 18 percent of that in the United 
States in 1990.   3
countries constitutes a major analytical and policy challenge to growth economists, accounting 
for the wide disparities in state productivity differences in the late nineteenth century United 
States, and their persistence well into the twentieth century, poses a related challenge, and one 
that has not been directly addressed.
5 
Given these large productivity differences, the experience of U.S. states provides an 
alternative laboratory for testing whether institutions or geography matter, and one that has 
several advantages. By employing regional data from within a country to analyze variation in 
productivity levels, the approach of this paper is less susceptible to omitted variables bias than 
the cross-country approach.
6 Just as languages, cultures, and technology flows differ markedly 
across countries, institutional differences are almost certainly more pronounced across countries 
than across U.S. states. This is not to deny a role for institutions in explaining differences in 
productivity across states; indeed, institutions still play a prominent role in our story. Rather it is 
to point out that identifying observable differences or accounting for unobservable differences is 
likely to be less of a problem in our case compared to the cross-country approach. Moreover, 
since institutional differences are more muted within the U.S. and detailed climate data have 
been collected on U.S. states for quite some time, the within-country sample should permit a 
                                                           
5 Since the U.S. average level of labor productivity is the weighted sum of that of the states, no account of the 
sustained rise in U.S. productivity levels over the past century is going to be complete without an understanding of 
the forces producing the changing regional contributions to that outcome. A second reason for attempting to account 
for the range in productivity levels across states is that the variation in state labor productivity accounts, in turn, for 
the major part of the variation in their living standards. Differences in the level of nominal income per capita 
between states in any year can be decomposed into three elements: differences in prices, labor input per capita, and 
a ‘residual’ measure of labor productivity. Only a small portion of the variation in incomes across states in any of 
the six years in the study is due to variation in prices - from minus one to plus 16 percent. Variation in labor input 
per capita contributes between 9 and 28 percent across these dates.  The remaining difference in income levels (56 
to 84 per cent) is attributed to variations in the average efficiency of workers. This analysis is reported in Mitchener 
and McLean (1999). 
6 It might be suggested that a greater degree of domestic than international labor mobility should be recognized as 
an important difference between interstate and cross-country analysis. However, income convergence across 
countries does not require migration. And the historical evidence of sustained regional segmentation within the U.S. 
labor market is well known (for example, Wright, 1986, 1987).   4
cleaner test of whether differences in geography matter for standards of living.  
To our knowledge, we are the first to analyze the determinants of variation in labor 
productivity levels over time rather than at a single point in time. Our paper uses a limited 
number of deeper determinants (such as geography and institutions) rather than proximate 
influences (such as investment in physical and human capital) to analyze differences in state 
productivity levels at twenty-year intervals between 1880 and 1980. Such an approach allows us 
to assess whether a small number of determinants are capable of explaining the variation in 
productivity levels for 100 years of U.S. history and to identify the influences that persist or 
wane.  
We find that institutional characteristics, physical geography, and resource abundance 
together can account for a high proportion of the variation in state productivity level differences, 
especially at the beginning of the period studied. Even within a country, institutions play a 
prominent role and appear robust to the inclusion of geographical influences: the legacy of 
slavery has a strong and persistent effect on productivity levels across U.S. states. However, no 
consistent support was found for one other influence given prominence in the cross-country 
regressions of income or productivity levels in recent years, namely climate. We find some 
evidence that a (small) reversal of fortune took place between the colonial period and present, 
with initially low productivity states achieving high levels by 1980. This is consistent with the 
view that institutions contribute to the evolution of productivity differences across regions or 
countries.  
Following a review of literature in the next section, section 3 explains the selection of our 
hypothesized key determinants of differences in productivity levels across states, drawing on the 
insights embedded in American economic historiography as well as recent growth analyses.   5
Section 4 discusses the data and also presents the empirical results from our core model, together 
with an assessment of their robustness by considering alternative proxies for the explanatory 
variables. The next three sections offer extensions and further testing of our core model. In 
Section 5, we use our data on U.S. states to further elucidate the nexus between latitude and 
climate. We also more closely examine our findings for the legacy of slavery variable and 
consider whether this institutional variable is endogenous (Section 6). Sections 7 and 8 extend 
our discussion to consider the influence of colonial origins on productivity and whether there has 
been a “reversal of fortune” in the economic performance of U.S. states. The main contributions 
and wider significance of our study are summarized in a concluding section.  
 
2.  Literature and Conceptual Framework 
 
The problem of economic development is widely acknowledged as one of “accounting for the 
observed pattern, across countries and across times, in levels and rates of growth of per capita 
income” (Lucas, 1988, p.3).  However, most theoretical and empirical research has primarily 
focused on the second half of this agenda – growth rates.
7  The approach of this paper, and a 
small but growing newer literature, is to explain why the substantial dispersion in per capita 
income or productivity levels exists.
8 Differences across countries in productivity levels usually 
result from the cumulative effect of a host of prior influences operating gradually and over long 
periods of time. Thus it is often difficult to detect the effects of such variables on growth rates, 
which may be imperceptible in the short to medium term, even though their eventual impact on 
                                                           
7 The relevant literature is well surveyed in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Temple (1999). 
8 To be sure, economic historians have long been aware of these differences in income and productivity levels, and 
have also participated in the search for a suitable framework to explain them. For example, see Landes (1990), 
Gerschenkron (1962), Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), Jones (1981), Lal (1998), and Diamond (1997).   6
levels can be large. Yet, because growth rates over the very long run have been uneven, these 
level differences between countries are increasing.
9 
The new empirical literature has focused on explaining differences in income or 
productivity levels across countries. Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) argue that the variation 
in the level of per capita income is determined by geographical factors (tropical diseases, natural 
resource endowment per capita, distance from world markets, and the proportion of population 
near coasts), and political and institutional factors (quality of government institutions, openness 
to trade, and legacy of colonial rule). They report that the four geographic explanatory variables 
alone account for 69 per cent of the variation in per capita income levels across 83 countries in 
1995. And in their study of cross-country levels of output per worker for 1988, Hall and Jones 
(1999) demonstrate that physical capital per worker, human capital per worker, and the Solow 
residual (and hence output per worker) can be accounted for by “social infrastructure,” an index 
covering the quality of government as well as openness to international trade. Since social 
infrastructure is endogenous, they use measures of the historical extent of western European 
influence as instruments for the quality of government (distance from the equator, and the extent 
to which English or a major European language is spoken), and a measure of predicted trade 
share (based on population and geography) as the instrument for openness. Most of the observed 
variation in levels of output per worker is accounted for by social infrastructure.
10   
More recently, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001a, 2001b) have sought to identify 
                                                           
9 This has led to the suggestion that “divergence in relative productivity levels and living standards is the dominant 
feature of modern economic history” (Pritchett 1997, p.3). 
10 The importance of non-conventional influences has likewise been stressed in studies of the determinants of labor 
productivity levels across U.S. states in recent years. Bernard and Jones (1996) highlight the relative size of 
particular sectors, and note especially that states with the highest private non-farm labor productivity levels after 
1963 were also those with the highest shares of output originating in mining. And in an investigation of the sources 
of inter-state variation in gross state product per worker in 1988, Ciccone and Hall (1996) report that more than half 
can be attributed to the agglomeration effects arising from the density of employment. See also Ram (1999),   7
the deeper and historical determinants of differential development – and hence currently 
differing levels of per capita income – among countries that once were colonies of the European 
powers. In particular, they emphasize the importance of institutions in their comparative analysis 
of long-run economic performance. Geography mattered only in the sense of creating different 
disease environments for potential settlement. The authors argue that the disease environment 
facing potential settlers was crucial to the type of institutions that were put in place. Where white 
settler mortality rates were high, European immigration was low, and the transfer of European 
institutions was less than where the environment was more benign, as in the temperate-zone 
colonies of European settlement. In the former, population density and incomes per capita were 
relatively high, but the institutions established by the colonizers were less conducive to long-run 
growth, encouraging an extractive basis for economic activity. In the latter, where pre-colonial 
population density and incomes both tended to be low, but subsequent European immigration 
high, there occurred a more comprehensive transfer of institutions which, it is hypothesized, 
thereby enhanced long-run growth. The authors argue that a “reversal of fortune” in economic 
performance of the sometime colonies has occurred, and that institutions are the critical 
determinant in explaining this phenomenon. 
 This article strikes out on a new, but related path in order to further clarify the debate 
over the relative importance of institutions versus geography. Our objective is to account for the 
substantial differences in levels of labor productivity across U.S. states in 1880 and at twenty-
year intervals thereafter. For this purpose, we identify fundamental influences (which we initially 
assume are exogenous) and proceed directly to estimate the relationship between output per 
worker and these hypothesized determinants. Such an approach will indicate either of two 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Beeson, DeJong, and Troesken (2001) and Homes (1998).   8
possibilities: that a limited number of deeper determinants account for most level differences 
across time and place (a result comforting to the economist’s desire to develop parsimonious 
models of general applicability) or that these fundamental influences are more numerous, and 
vary by period or place.  
 
3.  Determinants of Productivity Levels 
 
Because we are not searching for that “model” which necessarily best fits each year in 
the study, considering that year in isolation, the list of candidate determinants is considerably 
shortened. In the absence of clear guidance from theory, our selection of deeper explanatory 
variables draws partly on cross-country studies, which suggest that certain fundamental 
influences on productivity levels such as locational advantage (or disadvantage), climate 
(especially the advantage of temperate over tropical zones in terms of disease environment, soil 
fertility, and working conditions), and natural resource endowment might apply fairly 
generally.
11 On the other hand, many institutional factors canvassed in the cross-country growth 
literature (for example, language, culture, religion, legal system, or political system) are not 
likely to be paramount in an inquiry confined within the borders of the United States. 
Several of our fundamental determinants, including our primary institutional factor, are 
also based on evidence and debates that have been exhaustively evaluated by historians. From 
this rich literature we draw especially on one old and one new theme. The well-established 
theme is that in a major region of the economy, the South, income levels that were depressed 
during the Civil War did not converge on those in the rest of the country until after the 1930s. 
                                                           
11 In addition to previously cited references, see also Collier and Gunning (1999), Masters and McMillan (2000),   9
The reasons for this delayed catch-up appear rooted in the institutional arrangements in the South 
dating from the end of slavery.
12 The new theme concerns the importance of natural resource 
abundance.  Agricultural land was abundant in the 13 colonies, and the westward territorial 
expansion of the United States reinforced this favorable feature of the economy. However, 
Wright (1990) has argued that a related phenomenon, the discovery and exploitation of mineral 
resources, was significant in underpinning industrial development until 1940.
13 The following 
subsections discuss the theoretical and historical underpinnings of the institutional and 
geographical characteristics that we use to analyze the variation in productivity levels across 
U.S. states. 
 
3.1. The Legacy of Slavery 
 
The trajectory of the Southern economy was disrupted by important political and social 
events in the mid-nineteenth century. The Civil War (a negative shock) ushered in a well-known 
process of relative stagnation and delayed convergence from below. From 1860 to 1880, income 
levels in the South fell relative to the rest of the country and relative to its own 1860 level; 
incomes only began to converge rapidly in the post-WWII period. Emancipation triggered post-
bellum institutional changes that altered the relationships between factors of production that may 
have had a negative impact on the efficiency of production and hence on southern levels of 
income per capita. For example, former slave owners could no longer determine the number of 
hours worked and the type of work carried out by the free blacks, nor could they necessarily 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and Temple and Johnson (1998). 
12  See Ransom and Sutch (1977) and Wright (1986). 
13 Thereafter, the basis of growth, and especially of economic leadership relative to other early-industrializing 
countries, shifted to knowledge-based activities (Nelson and Wright, 1992).    10
influence the efficiency of production through the control of nutrition and health. Furthermore, 
in both the workplace and southern society at large, discrimination and legal restrictions placed 
on ex-slaves may have limited their access to education or their ability to secure either physical 
capital or land. Denying productive agents these economic opportunities may have decreased the 
efficiency of production in the post-bellum era. The heterogeneous institutional response to the 
demise of slavery throughout the South therefore might be an important underlying determinant 
of differences in the observed productivity levels across states. And this negative influence on 
efficiency may have persisted for many decades, as the economic catch-up of the southern states 
began only in the 1930s.
14 To proxy the legacy of slavery, we use the percentage of the state 
population in 1860 that were slaves.
15 As slavery has been associated with a host of factors 





                                                           
14 Wright (1974, 1986) has argued that the antebellum growth in the South was unsustainable, with or without the 
war, due to the decline in worldwide demand for cotton. Alternatively, Ransom and Sutch (1977) have focused on 
the labor supply effects of African Americans in response to emancipation, suggesting that the decline in Southern 
output is attributable to a reduction in hours worked by former slaves. These explanations, and others by Temin 
(1976), Fogel and Engerman (1974), Brinkley (1997), and Irwin (1994), shed light on the decline in southern per 
capita income after the war. 
15 Slave population data are from the U.S. Census of 1860. 
16 Explanations for the convergence of the South on national levels of income and productivity in the second half of 
the 20
th century are wide-ranging. Indeed, a vast literature exists on mechanisms linking the presence of slavery 
with lowered post-bellum income and productivity levels and delayed catch-up in these performance indicators with 
the rest of the country over the following century. Some examples include the rise of sharecropping in southern 
agriculture; the reduction of labor input following the abolition of a coercive plantation labor system; the failure of 
southern schooling to raise literacy and education levels among freedmen; the spread of legal discrimination based 
on race; the limited financial endowment of the freedmen at emancipation and hence the time taken to for them to 
accumulate assets; the territorial monopoly of sources of credit to freedmen resulting in debt peonage lock-in over 
many years; and the failure of a truly national labor market to emerge which included southern labor markets until 
after the 1930s. Surveys of this literature can be found in Ransom and Sutch (1977), Wright (1986, 1987) and 
O’Brien and Shade (2001).   11
3.2. Minerals Endowment 
 
Economists have reached no consensus as to whether resource abundance spurs or 
inhibits growth. Sachs and Warner (1995b) have shown that, since 1960, resource-abundant 
countries have experienced lower growth rates, suggesting that it is a curse rather than a blessing 
to be resource rich. One hypothesis in support of this empirical evidence is that resource-based 
development is likely to be accompanied by heavy government involvement, and the political 
process encourages wasteful rent seeking.
17  On the other hand, Wright (1990) has suggested that 
much of the industrial success of the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century was based on its ability to exploit quickly and efficiently its mineral resource base.
18 
Particularly in frontier economies, where labor and capital are often in scarce supply, having a 
large initial endowment of resources, especially (but not limited to) minerals and fuels, may 
improve the opportunities for economic agents to acquire scarce factors quickly – to grow 
extensively, acquiring more capital and labor so the resource base can be further exploited.
19 
This suggests that a region rich in readily extractable natural resources may record higher levels 
of output per worker.
20 
To test for the influence of resource endowment on productivity levels it would be ideal 
to have a measure of total natural resource stocks by state. However, state-level data on resource 
                                                           
17 Matsuyama (1992) proposes an alternative model which suggests that countries choosing to exploit their 
comparative advantage in natural resources may lock themselves into a long-run, low growth path if the neglected 
manufacturing sector has more favorable externalities. See also Redding (1999).  
18 For a broader historical discussion of the role of natural resource abundance in American economic growth, see 
Abramovitz and David (1996). 
19 Related themes are developed in Findlay (1995, Chapters 5 and 6). 
20 Some fairly direct support is reported by Bernard and Jones (1996) in their study of productivity by sector across 
U.S. states since 1963: those states with more than 20 percent of private non-farm product originating in mining 
have higher levels of labor productivity than non-mining states. Indirect support is provided by Gallup, Sachs and 
Mellinger (1999) who find that levels of per capita income across countries in 1995 are positively related to deposits 
of natural resources.   12
stocks are unavailable, and production data for some minerals are difficult to assign by state 
(major mines cross state borders and historical statistics often assign quantities or values to states 
where mining companies were located rather than where the resources were mined). Hence, we 
use the share of employment in mining in 1880 as a measure of natural resource abundance in a 
state.
21  (Summary statistics of this and other explanatory variables are reported in Table 1.) A 




In an era where air conditioning, heating, and climate control are standard in the 
workplace, it is difficult to think that climate significantly reduces any state’s average labor 
productivity. In 1880, however, weather may have severely altered both the hours worked and 
the level of efficiency at which one worked. The notion that climate influences work effort and 
thus productivity actually has a long tradition dating back at least to the 16
th century and the 
writings of Machiavelli (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001a).
22 As U.S. statistics on 
weather and temperature at the state level are quite detailed, we can assess the climate hypothesis 
more explicitly than has been possible in many cross-country studies. We used the average 
annual number of cooling degree days as our initial climate proxy – a measure which NOAA 
uses to determine the need for air conditioning in buildings.
23 Maine records the lowest value of 
this measure of climate, while Arizona has the highest. If heat impaired labor productivity 
(reflecting the disadvantages of working without air conditioning), then the expected sign on this 
variable will be negative; moreover, it will decline in importance over the sample period 
                                                           
21  For Oklahoma, we use the figure for 1900. Our data sources are Miller and Brainerd (1957), Perloff et al (1960),   13
especially after 1940 as the use of air conditioning diffuses. 
 
3.4. Locational Advantage and Trade 
 
In country studies, the growth rate and the level of per capita income are both shown to 
be positively related to the openness of the economy, conventionally measured as the ratio of 
total trade (exports plus imports) to income.
24 Other cross-country studies have emphasized 
physical impediments to trade as reflected in such geographic features as access to a coast or 
navigable waterway or distance to some relevantly defined point in the national or international 
economies.
25  Between U.S. states there exist only natural barriers to trade as opposed to 
politically imposed impediments, so our concern is to identify an advantage due to geography 
that reduces transport costs or improves the efficiency of production if a state was well served by 
transportation and information networks.  
For the period before the completion of the national railroad network freight rates for 
water transport were significantly lower than those for land, with ocean rates the lowest of all. 
Interstate trade, especially between non-contiguous states, was clearly facilitated by access to 
navigable water – as illustrated by the trade along the Atlantic seaboard from colonial times on, 
and the trade in raw materials on the Great Lakes (Taylor, 1951). International trade would also 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and the U.S. censuses. Our measure also includes any employment in the oil industry, although in 1880, this 
industry is in its infancy. 
22 Some of the anthropological literature, however, contends that work efficiencies may not vary significantly across 
temperature ranges.  
23 Each degree that the average air temperature for a given day is above 65 degrees F produces one cooling degree 
day. This means that if the average temperature is five degrees above 65F for a 30-day month, then that is 150 
cooling degree days. Data are from the Statistical Abstract of the United States (1992). See Appendix table 1 for 
further details. 
24  For a survery of postwar evidence, see Sachs and Warner (1995a). 
25 Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) find that countries with access to navigable waterways or with primarily 
coastal populations have higher levels of income.   14
be favored in coastal states or those with navigable rivers. Even when innovations in land 
transportation eroded these natural advantages, path dependence may have ensured that the 
advantages to states with navigable waterways persisted. 
What constitutes a navigable waterway (or access to the ocean) may be influenced by 
investment (e.g. in canals, locks, river-deepening) or by technological change (e.g. in riverboat 
design). Both of these may, in turn, be more likely to be undertaken in higher productivity 
regions or economies, suggesting the possibility of reverse causation.
26 To maintain an 
assumption of exogeneity, we initially define navigable waterways as an indicator variable 
where positive values indicate states that are coastal or border the Great Lakes. Since this 
variable is capturing how location can benefit trade, we expect that it will be positively related to 
the level of labor productivity.  
 
4.  Data and Analysis of Determinants 
 
The dependent variable in this study, what we call labor productivity, is derived from 
estimates of personal income per capita for each state. To calculate labor productivity, the 
personal income data were first adjusted for differences in price levels across states, for each of 
six census years between 1880 (the first year data for western states are available) and 1980 
using “relative” price indexes. This produced price-adjusted personal income per capita 
estimates that are calculated relative to U.S. average prices for a given year. These estimates 
were then further adjusted to a per worker basis using the employment-population ratio (or labor 
                                                           
26 This applies particularly to the issue of whether states along the Mississippi river system should be classified as 
having access to navigable water, and which states in which years. Mellinger, Sachs and Gallup (1999, p.4) employ 
a definition of navigable rivers as those that can accommodate vessels with a minimum draft of three meters; they 
assert that anything smaller would not be considered “ocean-going.”   15
input per capita) in each state. The labor productivity measure is thus (log) price-adjusted 
income per worker.
27  
The data set includes 47 states for 1880 and 48 for years thereafter.
28 We obtained data 
on our underlying determinants as well as state productivity for the six selected census years 
from 1880 to 1980 such that we could also measure how the effects of various factors change 
over a long period of time – something that previous cross-country studies examining differences 
in income or labor productivity levels have not examined. The sources and definitions of our key 
variables are given in Appendix Table 1, while the data are provided in Appendix Table 2. 
Our initial identifying assumption is that the fundamental determinants are uncorrelated 
with the random element of our measure of labor productivity; we therefore use ordinary least 
squares to estimate the parameters of the relation. Given our definitions for our determinants, 
this identifying assumption seems reasonable. Certainly climatic factors are exogenous as is the 
location of a state with respect to navigable water. A strong justification (discussed below) can 
also been made for the exogeneity of mining activity in a state. And since slave populations are 
for 1860, twenty years prior to our first year of productivity data, we also assume that this 
institutional variable is exogenous; however, given the debate in the literature over the 
endogeneity of institutions, we later relax this assumption.  
                                                           
27 These data are shown in Appendix Table 2. Detailed estimation methods and data sources are provided in 
Mitchener and McLean (1999), especially Appendix 1, which describes the derivation of the state price relatives. 
Because the relative price indexes are computed at a point in time (and not over time as is the case with deflated 
series), the price-adjusted dollar values of the labor productivity figures across our six time periods are not directly 
comparable. Note also that the price variation was greatest in 1880, when a 33 percentage-point variation occurred 
around the U.S. average price level and, unsurprisingly, when the highest price levels were recorded in the 
Mountain states. 
28 Because Alaska and Hawaii only become states in 1959 and reliable data are unavailable for earlier periods, we 
exclude these two states from our overall analysis. No estimates for state personal income per capita are available 
for Oklahoma in 1880, so we exclude it from our analysis for that year. The Dakota Territories are separated out 
into North and South Dakota for purposes of analysis in 1880, even though they received statehood in 1889. We 
also refer to Montana, Washington, Idaho, Utah, Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Arizona as “states,” though they 
were technically still territories in 1880; their boundaries did not change between territory status and statehood.   16
The results of the OLS regressions are reported in Table 2. Panel A shows the results for 
all six periods, while in Panel B we show the effect of sequentially adding the explanatory 
variables for 1880 only. In 1880, 1900, 1920 and 1940, the four identified determinants explain 
approximately 70 percent of the variation in productivity levels across states (using the adjusted 
R-squared). Figure 2 displays the overall fit of the equation for 1880 when the variation in state 
productivity levels was greatest. States above the 45-degree line produce more price-adjusted 
output per worker than our specification predicts, while states below the 45-degree line produce 
less than predicted. In the post-World War II period, the fundamental determinants are somewhat 
less successful, accounting for less than half of the variation in productivity in 1960 and 1980. 
This result may be due in part to the decline in the dispersion of labor productivity across states, 
making it more difficult to explain differences in productivity levels. (Expressed relative to the 
U.S. average, between 1940 and 1980, the standard deviation in the labor productivity across 
U.S. states falls from 25.8 to 11.0). It is also possible that one or more factors omitted from our 
specification emerged as having a significant impact on productivity levels across states only 
after 1940 or that underlying factors that drove economic development in its early stages (such 
as natural resource abundance or geographical advantages) are less important for explaining 
differences today. Even with these qualifications, our methodological approach of using a 
simple, general model to explain the variation in state productivity levels at six widely separated 
dates is largely borne out by the fit of the regressions. We now discuss the specific findings for 
each of the fundamental determinants. 
  
4.1. Minerals Endowment 
   17
A simple plot of labor productivity in 1880 on minerals endowment (as shown in 
Appendix Figure 1) supports the hypothesis that natural resources enhance productivity. 
Including the other elements of our model does not change this result.  In all years of our sample, 
the regression coefficient reported in Table 2 is positive. Moreover, this determinant was 
statistically significant at conventional levels until 1940, suggesting that states obtained a 
productivity advantage from their mineral abundance even after controlling for other 
influences.
29 In 1880, for example, 27 states had less than one percent of their workforce in 
mining while seven states had more than 10 percent. An increase of 10 percentage points in the 
share of mining in a state’s employment was, in that year, associated with an increase of 11 
percent in labor productivity in that state. Moreover, the coefficient on mining employment is 
positive and economically significant despite the fact that our measure of labor productivity 
already factors in state-level differences in demographic characteristics. That is, it was entirely 
possible that the estimated relationship between minerals endowment and labor productivity 
would be zero since the specification of the dependent variable already accounts for the high 
labor input per capita that the mining sector typically attracted.
30 
In principle, the natural resource endowment would seem unambiguously exogenous to 
the level of productivity: a region either possesses gold, oil, or copper or it does not. Moreover, 
the endowment of minerals is not evenly spread across the globe or political units. Yet the search 
and exploitation stages of mineral development may require levels of investment and technology 
that are positively related to the level of economic development. David and Wright (1997) have 
advanced the view that the expansion of U.S. mining in the nineteenth century which led to 
                                                           
29 The positive sign is also consistent with what Bernard and Jones (1996) find for the 1980s. 
30 The demographic characteristics of many western states in the late nineteenth century – high masculinity ratios 
and a high percentage of people of working age – may reflect employment in resource-based industries (Mitchener 
and McLean, 1999).    18
American dominance in world production of most economically important minerals (Wright, 
1990) resulted in part from the American lead in relevant scientific and technological 
knowledge, which in turn was the product of high U.S. incomes. However, their view is not 
relevant to an examination of the experience of states and regions within the United States. There 
were no barriers to the flow of capital and technology across state boundaries, and firms and 
individuals could take their investment and talents wherever they saw the opportunity for the 
highest potential return.
31  In mining, this is likely to have been where the prospect of mineral 
discovery was greatest, or where some prior mining activity existed.
32 In this context, the 
endowment of minerals is likely to be exogenous – a claim that is substantiated by regional 
histories: mineral discoveries famously precede economic development in many states in the 
Mountain and Pacific regions. We therefore interpret the positive coefficient as evidence that 
there were indeed productivity effects of mineral abundance in addition to the boost to income 
per capita that came from the favorable demography and workforce characteristics associated 
with mining. In the context of the development of U.S. states before 1940, to be mineral rich led 




If climate affects work effort, then warmer climates should have lower productivity 
levels. This view suggests that the sign of the coefficient for number of cooling-degree days 
                                                           
31 The important contributions (as documented by David and Wright (1997)) made by faculty and graduates of 
geology or mining programs at schools such as Yale, Columbia, and Harvard to the discovery and development of 
minerals in the far western states, well illustrates the point. 
32 An assessment of the determinants of gold discoveries across U.S. states in the late nineteenth century is 
contained in Eichengreen and McLean (1994), who emphasize the importance of recent settlement (by Europeans) 
to the timing of such finds: few occurred in states that were long settled.   19
would be negative. Appendix Figure 2 plots the simple relationship between climate and (log) 
productivity in 1880 and is suggestive of this hypothesis. However, when the additional 
covariates of our model are added, the negative relationship does not persist. Instead, the sign on 
the coefficient reported in Table 2 is positive, small in magnitude, and statistically insignificant. 
This suggests that climate does not account for any of the variation in productivity levels across 
states in any of the years in the study once the other independent influences have been included. 
We also considered whether climate influenced productivity via a quadratic relationship (rows 1 
and 2, Table 3), but no statistically significant and negative relationship was found.  
We have thus far focused on the potential benefits to productivity from altering climate. 
An alternative hypothesis suggests that disease ecology and agronomic processes can be 
influenced by climate and may, in turn, alter productivity. This has led Gallup, Sachs, and 
Mellinger (1999) to conclude that temperate climates are more productive.
33 Masters and 
McMillan (2000) suggest that ecological zones experiencing frosts have higher crop yields 
because frost episodes alter plant respiration, water-evaporation rates, crop spoilage, topsoil 
availability, and the presence of pests and parasites. Similarly, vector and waterborne diseases 
that flourish in warmer climates, and which affect human health and productivity if endemic, are 
frustrated by frosts. To test for these relationships, we considered two further proxies that 
emphasize the importance of climate’s effects through health and agronomic systems: total 
accumulation of snow and ice pellets and the number of days in a year when the minimum 
temperature was at or below 32F.
34 The results shown in the rows 3 and 4 of Table 3 do not 
support this alternative hypothesis. A positive sign on these two measures would be consistent 
with this alternative climate hypothesis. In years where the sign is positive, the coefficient is 
                                                           
33  For variation in the disease ecology across states, see Brinkley (1997), Coehlo and McGuire (1997), and   20
statistically insignificant at conventional levels. 
 
4.3. Locational Advantage and Trade 
 
In contrast to the results for climate, Table 2 supports the proposition that physical 
geography has an independent influence on productivity levels. States that border the ocean or 
Great Lakes have significantly higher productivity in all years in this study. In 1880, the 
locational advantage is associated with a 24 percent lift in labor productivity. This advantage 
fluctuates between 18 and 33 percent through 1940, but declines in magnitude to around 10 
percent in the last 40 years of the sample period. Our result is consistent with cross-country 
studies that show that access to navigable waterways is associated with higher income or 
productivity levels. Despite the ascendancy of rail, road, and air transport, having access to a 
navigable waterway appears to lock in long-term productivity advantages.  
This finding was also subjected to sensitivity analysis, by varying the definition of access 
to navigable water. Table 4 reports the results from substituting six alternative measures for this 
physical feature of a state. To save space we do not report the 36 regressions – just the 
coefficients on the alternative proxy variables for access to navigable water from each 
regression. A comparison of the results reported in the first row of Table 4 with those in Table 2 
indicates that the removal of the states bordering the Great Lakes (leaving only those with access 
to the ocean) reduces the size of the effect in both 1880 and 1980, but otherwise does not affect 
this determinant. The second row considers the effects of the Great Lakes only. Access to the 
Great Lakes is important to the explanation of differences in state productivity levels in four of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Bleakley (2002). For a longer run perspective across countries, see Jones (1981).   21
the six periods, although the size of the coefficients is somewhat smaller than having access to 
an ocean. The positive and significant coefficient on Great Lakes is consistent with historical 
studies that have emphasized how access to the Great Lakes facilitated interregional and 
overseas trade. The Great Lakes greatly expanded the usefulness of canal systems (especially 
New York’s), lowered freight rates, and permitted goods from the West to flow directly 
eastward.
35 Bulky or heavy agricultural products like wheat and corn, or natural resources, such 
as lumber and lead, were predominantly carried by water, with the Great Lakes figuring centrally 
in their eastward movement to oceans or to eastern cities; rail, on the other hand, typically 
carried livestock, hides, and general merchandise (Taylor, 1951). When the variable is defined to 
take into account access to navigable rivers, by itself or together with access to the ocean or 
Great Lakes (rows 3-6), the estimated coefficients are almost never statistically significant.
36 It 
appears that, at least by 1880, any productivity advantage of having access to river transport and 
communication that may have existed before the railroad era had already been lost. In contrast, 
the locational advantage of the Great Lakes likely persisted since they served a complementary 
role (as a conduit for bulky and heavy products) even as railroad tonnage increased.  
 
4.4. Legacy of Slavery 
 
Finally, the negative and statistically significant coefficient on 1860 slave population 
shown in Table 2 strongly confirms the hypothesis that slavery had lasting and pernicious effects 
on levels of state productivity. (The univariate relationship between 1880 (log) productivity and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
34 Data are from the Statistical Abstract of the United States (1992). See Appendix Table 1 for further details. 
35 Tonnage on the Erie Canal continued to grow despite railroad competition and did not peak until the 1880s 
(Taylor, 1951). 
36 We are grateful to Andrew Mellinger for assistance with these data.     22
the legacy of slavery variable is displayed in Appendix Figure 3.) The estimates in Table 2 
indicate that as late as 1940, more than seven decades after emancipation, a state whose 
population was 10 percent slaves in 1860 would have a 14 percent lower level of productivity. A 
subsidiary hypothesis was that any measurable impact of the legacy of slavery in 1880 would 
fade as the institutions inhibiting more efficient economic arrangements in the post-bellum South 
underwent gradual change. Somewhat surprisingly, the legacy of slavery variable exerts a 
negative and significant influence on state labor productivity for the entire century, but as 
predicted, the magnitude of the coefficients on this variable declines over time. Since our data 
are at 20-year intervals, some caution should be exercised in terms of pinpointing the precise 
decline in this variable’s influence. But there is support here for the view that only in recent 
decades has the distinct and independent drag on southern economic efficiency, originating in 
the slave-plantation era, finally lifted (Wright, 1987).  
To check the robustness of our legacy of slavery finding, we considered an alternative 
measure: the number of slaves owned by slaveholders with 20 or more slaves in 1860 as a 
percent of the total state population.
37 This proxy captures the relative importance of plantation 
slaveholding, recognizing the debate about the productivity consequences of scale economies in 
antebellum agriculture (see, for example, Irwin (1994)). If the greatest dislocation to the 
institutional arrangements in the post-bellum South was associated with the end of the plantation 
system, then this alternative measure of the legacy of slavery may more precisely capture its 
impact on productivity levels in 1880. A comparison of the results in Panel A of Table 5 with 
those in Table 2 shows no change in sign and almost no change in significance in any year. 
To test whether the legacy of slavery variable is simply capturing a “southern effect,” 
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instead of a measure of the intensity of slavery in a state, we re-estimated the core model 
including interaction effects. Specifically, in Panel B of Table 5 we interact a dummy variable 
(where one indicates a slaveholding state) with each of the (non-slave) explanatory variables and 
include these with the other explanatory variables used in the original analysis. Since all but one 
of the 18 interaction terms (across all years) has a coefficient that is insignificant at the 5-percent 
level, we can reject the hypothesis that the legacy of slavery variable is standing in for a generic 
“southern effect.” 
As a final robustness check, we test whether our legacy of slavery variable is in fact 
picking up some omitted influence from the importance of river transport and communications. 
Some of the states with slaves in 1860 were also states with access to navigable portions of the 
Mississippi river system. In Table 6 we report two tests designed to assess this hypothesis. In 
Panel A the core model is re-estimated excluding the access to navigable water variable. The 
coefficient on slavery is unchanged in sign and remains significant at the one percent level until 
1960. In Panel B we drop slavery from the core model and substitute access to river as the proxy 
for access to navigable water. The access to navigable river is not significant in any of the six 
regressions even at the ten percent level, while the overall explanatory power of the model has 
fallen sharply in all years. We conclude that our slavery variable is not simply reflecting an 
omitted influence of river transport and communication. 
 
5. On Latitude and Climate 
 
We justified including a measure of climate as an explanatory variable because of its 
potential impact on hours of work and the level of efficiency at which one works or its influence   24
on diseases and soil fertility. A number of cross-country studies have also found latitude to be an 
important factor in accounting for differences in cross-country income growth rates and income 
or labor productivity levels. Hall and Jones (1996, 1999) argue that national economies located 
in temperate zones tend to be more successful than those in tropical regions. Using the distance 
from the equator as a proxy for climate, they find that temperate climates favor productivity.
38 
On the other hand, Nordhaus (1994) finds that latitude contributes only small, but measurable 
differences in income across countries.  
We did not initially focus on latitude as a measure of climate partly because we had 
reliable climate statistics that were better suited for tests of the climate hypotheses. Moreover, 
latitude is highly correlated with our legacy of slavery variable, and we had solid grounds for 
retaining a direct measure of the regional productivity effect of the legacy of slavery. However, 
given the prominence it has been assigned in related studies, it is valuable to assess whether 
latitude is a good proxy for climate – at least for the case of U.S. states.  
The latitude (degrees from the equator) was chosen as that of the largest city in the state 
in the relevant year, so this varied (slightly) between the years in this study. The values of the 
other climate measures did not vary, as they are based on city data (usually for multiple cities) 
using meteorological observations averaged over many years. In Table 7 the direct correlation is 
displayed between latitude and each of the five other measures of climate. The correlation with 
latitude varies according to the selected measure of climate, but all the correlations are quite 
strong. This leaves open the question of which climatic feature is most relevant to the 
determination of productivity levels, and does not rule out the possibility that latitude is a good 
proxy for the effect of a region’s climate on its level of productive efficiency. 
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6. Endogeneity of Institutions? 
 
Thus far, we have offered a simple framework for understanding the differences in levels 
of labor productivity across U.S. states and over time, and have tested whether a core set of 
underlying determinants provides insight into this issue. The estimation approach we have 
employed requires that the hypothesized determinants of productivity levels in each state be 
exogenous. We have argued that our measures of geography across U.S. states (climate, minerals 
endowment, and access to navigable waterways) are unambiguously independent of the level of 
productivity or of economic development more generally in 1880 and later years. Our additional 
assumption in section 4 was that the legacy of slavery (measured by 1860 slave population) was 
also exogenous. However, there is an extensive debate in the growth literature as to whether 
institutions are truly exogenous to the level of development, and this issue has recently spilled 
over into the literature on measuring differences in levels of productivity across countries 
(Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001a, 2001b and McArthur and Sachs, 2001). This 
subsection therefore considers whether the legacy of slavery is an endogenous variable. 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001a, 2001b) have suggested that the mortality of 
British soldiers and priests is a reasonable instrument for addressing the endogeneity of 
institutions in cross-country regressions. They argue that the susceptibility of British settlers to 
the disease environment influenced whether (former) colonies adopted extractive or wealth-
creating institutions, and these institutions in turn explain observed differences in productivity 
levels. Within a country, where institutional differences are less pronounced, the causal 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
capita. See also Masters and McMillan (2000), Mellinger, Sachs and Gallup (1999), and Ram (1999).  Diamond   26
connection between disease and institutional adaptation may operate differently or not apply at 
all. In the context of the U.S. states, settler mortality may have influenced the labor supply of 
(future) states, and hence the states where the institution of slavery took hold. As Coehlo and 
McGuire (1997) have noted, the importation of African slaves occurred in larger numbers in 
British colonies (such as the future Southern states of the U.S.) where it was more difficult to 
attract European settlers because of climates that fostered malaria, hookworm, and other tropical 
diseases to which European settlers lacked genetic resistance. On the other hand, African slaves 
faced higher mortality rates in the northern colonies due to cold-weather diseases; investments in 
European indentured servants were therefore more profitable than slaves in these colonies. Given 
the unwillingness of European settlers to migrate to southern colonies due to higher mortality 
risk in these regions, the importation (and breeding) of slaves from tropical West Africa 
presented itself as a cost-effective way for European settlers to overcome what otherwise would 
have been a labor shortage in the production of agricultural crops such as rice, indigo, and 
tobacco. Hence within the United States, it is possible that both settler mortality and climate (as 
it relates to the disease environment and crop choice) determined the adoption of slavery.
39 
In cross-country regressions, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001b) use soldier 
mortality of non-native soldiers to proxy for the relationship between settler mortality and the 
“virgin-soil” disease environment. For their U.S. data point, they draw on soldier mortality 
estimates derived from the records of disease mortality collected by the U.S. Surgeon General’s 
Office for the periods 1829-38 and 1839-54. These soldier mortality data are also reported for 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(1997) claims to identify a link between longitude and latitude and productivity over the very long run. 
39 Given that slavery is the key institutional difference across U.S. states, it is somewhat puzzling (given slavery’s 
exploitative and coercive nature) that Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson code the United States as uniformly 
adopting non-extractive institutions. Surely labor contracts that deny liberty and mobility, and fail to protect an 
individual’s economic choices would be classified as extractive institutions. The explanation advanced for the U.S. 
states also differs from their work on countries in another way: the disease environment antithetical to European   27
individual forts (Lawson, 1840, 1856), which we used to compute mortality at the state level.
40 
Since these records are for a period pre-dating major medical advances in fighting tropical 
diseases, previous research has assumed that they are a reasonable proxy for the mortality that 
17
th- or 18
th-century settlers would have faced in the United States.  
In Table 8 we present the results of instrumental variable (IV) regressions using soldier 
mortality as an instrument for the legacy of slavery. (Appendix Figure 4 displays the relationship 
between soldier mortality and the percentage of slaves in 1860.) The preliminary results suggest 
that the legacy of slavery variable remains robust to IV specification – at least for the 1880 to 
1940 period. Given that the OLS version also explains less of the variation in productivity levels 
in 1960 and 1980, it is not terribly surprising that the model’s R-squared using the IV 
specification is poor after 1940, especially since the coefficient on the legacy of slavery variable 
declines in economic significance in either specification. One serious caveat to using the U.S. 
Surgeon General data to proxy for differences in the mortality risk of settlement is that the 
records are based on data for U.S. soldiers and not British or non-U.S. soldiers. Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson’s use of soldier mortality as an instrumental variable is predicated on the 
notion that there has been no biological adaptation to the disease environment; this is a valid 
assumption if the soldiers are non-native and have not developed a resistance to disease or 
figured out (non-medical) ways to reduce the incidence of tropical diseases.
41 Using the 
mortality of U.S.-born soldiers as a proxy for the disease risk that Europeans settling in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
settlement in the U.S. is not necessarily correlated with population density. 
40 Soldier mortality is expressed as a percent of “mean strength.” See Appendix Table 1 for data sources and a 
description of our computations and Appendix Table 2 for the state estimates of soldier mortality. 
41 Curiously, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001b) fail to point out that some soldier mortality rates in their 
study, including those for the United States, are not based on British soldiers, but indigenous soldiers; although this 
omission may matter less across countries. See Curtin (1989) for further discussion of the cross-country mortality 
data. Curtin also notes that soldiers were able to figure out relatively quickly non-medical ways of reducing the 
incidence of disease (such as moving to higher or less damp locations), and that these adjustments likely had a   28
(future) U.S. states in the 17
th and 18
th centuries faced therefore may be too strong of an 
assumption. The IV estimates shown in Table 8 should therefore be viewed as suggestive 
(especially given the small sample sizes) rather than conclusive.
42  
Moreover, additional econometric tests suggest that the legacy of slavery variable is not 
endogenous, and that the OLS model is not inconsistent. A Hausman test comparing the 
instrumental variable regression and the OLS regression does not reject the null hypothesis that 
OLS is a consistent estimator for the model (prob > chi-squared = 0.94). The alternative test 
suggested by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, pp.236-42) also fails to reject the null hypothesis 
that the OLS specification is inconsistent (prob > F = 0.42). Given our reservations about using 
soldier mortality as an instrument for the legacy of slavery, these model specification tests 
provide further justification for preferring the OLS specification.
  
 
7.  Colonial Origins of Development 
 
European colonists who settled the Americas carried with them their inherited ideals and 
customs about landholding and land tenure practices, taxation, civil law, and crime and law 
enforcement. Despite certain shared experiences as Europeans, their attitudes towards these and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
significant impact on soldier mortality rates. 
42 Due to our concerns about the applicability of the U.S. soldier mortality data, we considered constructing 
alternative instruments. Our most promising alternative instrumental variable for the legacy of slavery was the 
percentage of churches or congregations in a state that were tolerant towards slavery (see Appendix Table 1). 
Across the nascent U.S. states, European colonists belonged to a variety of Christian sects, some of which were less 
tolerant of slavery. As has been well documented (Hall, 1930 and Steckel, 2000), Puritans, Quakers, and 
Congregationalists objected to slavery on moral grounds, and later played a role in the Northern abolitionist 
movement. On the other hand, Presbyterians, Protestants, Episcopalians, Lutherans, and Catholics were more 
tolerant of its presence, and viewed the scriptures as taking no moral position on it. Since attitudes toward slavery 
varied across Christian sects in 1790, and since these attitudes are unlikely to be correlated with the error term in 
labor productivity regressions, this variable looked promising. However, the R-squared in the first-stage regression 
did not improve when this variable was added, suggesting that it is not a very good instrument, and the variable 
itself was statistically insignificant in the first stage regression.   29
the laws that competing sovereigns initially enforced differed considerably.
43 For example, 
differences in landholding practices varied. In areas initially under Spanish dominion, private 
property rights were established by virtue of land grants, title, and residency; in contrast, in areas 
of French influence such as Louisiana, land was granted without fee but not guaranteed by any 
official deed. Such differences may have persisted and this legacy of colonial origins may have 
in turn exerted an influence on productivity even after the United States was formed.  
In Table 9, we incorporate institutional differences that may have arisen due to 
differences in the heritage of early settlement by focusing on the four major groups that 
influenced colonial settlement in the part of North America that would become the United States: 
England, Spain, France and Holland. An indicator variable takes a value of one in each state 
where, prior to statehood, the area had ties with one of these North American colonial powers 
(except for England, which is the omitted country). The results presented in earlier tables are 
robust to the addition of colonial influence in all years, and suggest no significant influence from 
this source prior to 1940. For these years, the coefficients for the colonial legacy variables are 
(with one exception) statistically insignificant. The positive and significant signs on Spanish 
Settler in 1960 and 1980 almost certainly reflect the favorable post-war growth experience of the 
Sunbelt states (nearly all of whom had significant early Spanish settlement). We conclude there 
is no clear evidence of any direct link between this measure of colonial origins and subsequent 
productivity levels across states. 
 
8.  Reversal of Fortune? 
 
                                                           
43 For a detailed discussion of these differences, see Cooke (1993).   30
In this section, analogous to the recent cross-country work of Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2001a), we explore whether there has been a reversal of fortune in the prosperity of 
U.S. states. They argue that, where there was extensive European settlement (in countries such as 
the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand), there occurred a comprehensive transfer 
of institutions that were conducive to long-run economic growth. Where there was little 
settlement by Europeans, the institutional transfer was much less, and colonial institutions were 
more oriented towards the extraction than creation of wealth. The upshot has been that the settler 
economies have prospered relative to those colonies that did not attract large numbers of 
Europeans. Since the latter were probably richer in pre-colonial times, there has been a “reversal 
of fortune” in the histories of these economies.  
The comparative economic growth performance of regions or states of the United States 
over the very long run offers the opportunity to assess the reversal of fortune hypothesis from a 
new perspective. However, adapting the reversal hypothesis to the experience of U.S. states 
requires taking into account several historical factors that complicate the application of this 
theory to a cross-state context. First, in contrast to the analysis of countries, all of the original 
U.S. states were major recipients of European settlers. Expanding the geographical coverage to 
all states and not just the original British colonies, the experience of European settlement also 
looks quite different from what Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson describe as taking place at the 
country level. The sparsely populated areas west of the Appalachians remained largely unsettled 
during the colonial period. The lack of initial settlement in these areas occurred in spite of the 
fact that the land was made even more sparsely populated by the arrival of Europeans. Their 
presence on the North American continent (even in small numbers) had a large negative impact 
on populations of Native Americans due to the diseases they brought with them. These diseases   31
swept across the area that would become the United States, and this should have increased the 
possibilities for settlement, but competing land claims by rival European governments, 
uncertainty over property rights, and geographical barriers likely limited the scope of initial 
settlement in other parts of the future United States. Finally, with the exception of slavery, 
differences between extractive and wealth-promoting institutions across states are more muted 
than across countries.  
Our test of the reversal of fortune hypothesis is therefore performed to assess the relative 
importance of institutions relative to geographical factors. If geography is relatively more 
important than institutions in accounting for economic performance over the long run, then those 
states that were relatively rich in earlier periods will still be rich today. In contrast, if institutions 
are more important for economic performance a reversal of fortune will take place. 
We examine this hypothesis by first considering the period from 1880 to 1980, and 
noting whether the states which had relatively high (low) productivity levels in 1880 are now 
states with relatively low (high) levels of productivity. The correlation is positive and 
statistically significant (p = 0.048) and the Spearman rank correlation coefficient between the 
labor productivity figures for 1880 and 1980 is 0.4253 (the p value for a test of independence is 
0.0029). The positive signs in these tests suggest that no reversal of fortune took place over the 
100-year period of this study. The first row of Table 10 reports a regression of 1980 log 
productivity on 1880 log productivity. The coefficient on 1880 log productivity is positive even 
when we include the other conditioning variables of our core model. While the Western states 
converged from above between 1880 and 1940, and the Southern states made significant gains 
relative to the U.S. average after 1940, there was not a dramatic reshuffling of the rank of states 
over this 100-year period.   32
A somewhat more speculative test, but also more in the spirit of the approach used in the 
cross-country literature, requires that we frame the reversal of fortune hypothesis as a 
comparison of the American colonial period with the present. An obvious shortcoming of this 
test is that we have to abandon our measure of price-adjusted income per worker for something 
that may only crudely proxy the economic performance of the (future) U.S. states during the 
period of initial European settlement. Following Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001a, 
2001b), we use population density as a proxy for the level of productivity of a (future) state. As 
Table 11 shows, state population density (urbanization) rates and the log of price-adjusted 
income per worker are positively correlated for our original sample period of 1880 to 1980, 
suggesting that these may be reasonable proxies for labor productivity in periods when labor 
productivity data are not available.
44 A serious drawback to using population density as a proxy 
for labor productivity in the colonial period is that the data are, at best, highly speculative 
because no censuses of Native Americans residing in what would become the United States were 
attempted until well after the United States was a country, and because the precise impact on 
Native Americans of diseases that European settlers brought with them is unknown. Estimates of 
indigenous populations residing in the (future) United States at the time of contact vary 
enormously, are highly dependent on the assumptions made by researchers (including estimates 
of mortality due to smallpox, measles, and other diseases), and consequently paint very different 
pictures of population density at the time of European settlement (Daniels, 1992). 
Despite a long and contentious debate about the size of the indigenous population in 
America, very little research has attempted to build up estimates at a tribal level – a necessary 
                                                           
44 We also substituted population density and urbanization for labor productivity into the regressions reported in 
Table 2. For 1880, the signs for the legacy of slavery variable and access to navigable waterways remain the same 
and the coefficients are still significant; however, in the urbanization regression mining is insignificant and in the 
population density regression it enters with the opposite sign.   33
prerequisite for determining population density or urbanization at the state level. Given that the 
extant data for constructing state populations are limited and fragile, our estimates of population 
density during the colonial period (a more reliable measure than urbanization given what little is 
known about specific, pre-Colombian settled populations of Native Americans) are therefore 
quite speculative. Our procedure for compiling these estimates and adding them to the stock of 
early European settlers and blacks (including slaves) in the United States is described in detail in 
Appendix Table 1. 
The correlation between population density in the colonial period and labor productivity 
in 1980 is weakly negative for both the 1700 and 1770 estimates of population density (Table 
11), suggesting that there may have been some reversal in economic fortune. This reversal stands 
in contrast to the persistence observed in the post-1880 period (Figure 3); however, the result is 
sensitive to outliers. Although the sign does not change, the statistical significance and size of 
the negative coefficient are much smaller when Rhode Island (the state with the greatest colonial 
population density in 1700 and 1770) is removed from the sample.
45 To test the reversal 
hypothesis more systematically, we regress 1980 labor productivity on colonial population 
density and a constant, and then add additional covariates to control for the geographical factors 
as well as the colonial origin of a state. To save space, only the coefficient on population density 
is reported, but it is reported for both 1700 and 1770 (rows 2 and 3 of Table 10) to see if the 
results are sensitive to the influx of European settlement between these two dates. The sign on 
population density is negative and statistically significant using either the 1700 or 1770 figures. 
The reversal of incomes persists when we include the additional covariates from our core model 
                                                           
45 The coefficient on population density is -0.002 (s.e. = 0.003) in 1700 and –0.0006 (s.e. = 0.001) in 1770 when 
Rhode Island is excluded from the sample. The population density estimate for Rhode Island in 1700 is driven in 
large part by a large native population relative to the state’s area, but it is much higher than any other state in 1770, 
even if we consider the population density figures that exclude Native Americans (52.6).   34
(and as the last column shows, this is not simply a proxy for the colonial origins of a state); 
however, the overall effect is quite small. With an average population density per square mile of 
5.75 people in 1770, a one-standard deviation reduction in 1770 population density is associated 
with approximately a 2-3 percent boost to labor productivity in 1980. The figure is only slightly 
larger (around 7 percent) if we consider 1700 population density, and in either case, the result is 
still sensitive to the outlier state, Rhode Island. Over the longer period of several centuries, the 
data suggest that some reversal of fortune may have occurred across U.S. states, but the effect is 
smaller when compared to what has been found across countries. Comparing our results to the 
cross-country literature, a 10 percent higher population density in 1700 or 1770 is associated 
with 1980 state labor productivity being 1.3 – 1.4 percent lower; the same increase in colonial 
population density for a country would lead to current income per capita being around 4 percent 
lower (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001a).  
Finally, we can also take advantage of the fact that our study spans one hundred years of 
U.S. history to identify whether the reversal of fortune had taken place by 1880 and to pin down 
whether the reversal had materialized by the end of the nineteenth century, perhaps as the result 
of the spread of European agricultural technologies from the 16
th to 18
th centuries (McCusker 
and Menard, 1985). In the second panel of Table 10, we regress 1880 log labor productivity on 
the population density estimates from the colonial period. The results suggest that states that 
were rich in the colonial period were still rich as of 1880. 
 
9.  Conclusion 
 
In the search for convincing explanations of massive and persistent differences in   35
productivity levels, and hence of living standards, we find in the historical experience of the 
United States a fruitful natural extension to the cross-country approach. Indeed, the analysis of 
states may offer a more fertile testing ground for competing hypotheses because, unlike 
countries, states share a common language, a similar culture, and likely have the same access to 
new technologies. Such features have often been difficult to control for in cross-country analysis. 
This paper was motivated by the empirical observation that labor productivity levels 
showed considerable variation across U.S. states at six census years from 1880 to 1980. In 1880 
the differences were quite substantial, with the lowest-ranked state having a level of labor 
productivity only 18 per cent of that of the highest-ranked; whereas by 1980 the lowest-ranked 
state had risen to 60 percent of the top performer.  
To account for this productivity dispersion, we have tested a number of hypotheses 
drawn from both the growth and economic history literatures. Our results suggest that a small 
number of exogenous variables (institutional, resource, and geographic characteristics) do 
extremely well in capturing the variation in productivity levels across states for 100 years of U.S. 
history. The relationship is especially strong through 1940, where our specification accounts for 
approximately 70 percent of the variation in productivity levels across states.  
The experience of the U.S. states suggests that both geography and institutions matter. 
Consistent with historians’ emphasis on institutional impediments, we find that the legacy of 
slavery has a persistently pernicious effect on productivity levels well into the 20
th century. From 
1880 to 1940, slavery had a significant effect on state labor productivity; states with slave 
populations of 10% had productivity levels that were on average 14 to 20 percent lower than 
those without slaves over this period. This finding is also consistent with cross-country studies 
that have emphasized the role of institutions in explaining differences in incomes (Acemoglu,   36
Johnson, and Robinson (2001a, 2001b). On the other hand, productivity levels were positively 
associated with both mineral abundance and geographic features suited to transportation. While 
some studies have found growth rates to be negatively correlated with natural resource 
abundance, our positive relationship with productivity levels seems quite plausible; particularly 
in frontier economies, having a large initial endowment of resources may have propelled the 
acquisition of scare factors (capital and labor), and permitted further exploitation of resources. 
Over the course of development, states may have been able to overcome the tyranny of 
geography by constructing locks and deepening rivers; nevertheless, we find that states initially 
blessed with a seaport or located on the Great Lakes possessed a built-in advantage for trade (and 
settlement), which resulted in long-term benefits to their productivity levels. As a result of the 
importance of these geographic factors, state productivity levels do not show evidence of 
reversal since 1880. Finally, in contrast to some of the cross-country literature, we find no 
systematic role for climate. In part, this may reflect the smaller degree of variation of this factor 
within a country. 
We have contributed to the analysis of why levels of labor productivity differ across 
space and time, complementing the more orthodox economic analysis of the reasons for variation 
in rates of growth. We have argued the case for a direct attack on the deeper determinants of 
levels of productivity, though we recognize the difficulty of the task given the paucity of clear 
theoretical guidance in the growth literature, and are aware of the ensuing methodological 
limitations. The challenge facing growth economists is to better explain why there are high- and 
low-productivity economies, and hence rich and poor societies. In responding to this challenge, 
we have suggested that the historical experience of U.S. states offers a valuable source of 
pertinent evidence for developing models that explain these differences. Our cross-state and   37
historical approach thus complements the cross-country studies relating to recent years.   
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Relationships    
        
Panel A: Sample Descriptive Statistics        
   Standard   
  Mean deviation Minimum Maximum 
        
Percentage of 1880 workforce in mining  5.20  9.80  0.00  38.50 
Average number of cooling degree days (100's)  11.59  8.49  2.68  41.62 
Percentage of 1860 population in slavery 10.50  17.90  0.00  57.20 
Percentage of 1860 population in slavery on   5.20  10.90  0.00  38.50 
     large plantations         
        
Panel B: Univariate Regressions for 1880        
        
Dependent Variable: Log Price-Adjusted Income per Worker     
       
Percentage of workforce   0.016***      
   in mining in 1880  (0.005)      
 [0.004]      
        
Average number of cooling    -0.027**    
   degree days (100's)    (0.012)     
   [0.025]     
        
Percentage of 1860 population       -0.019***  
   in slavery      (0.002)   
     [0.000]   
        
Access to ocean or Great        -0.054 
   Lakes        (0.120) 
       [0.656] 
        
Adjusted R-Squared  0.14  0.30  0.65  0.00 
Number of observations  47  47  47  47 
        
Notes: White's consistent covariance estimator is used. Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses and p-values are shown in square brackets. One, two, or three stars on a  
coefficient indicates significance at the 10-percent, 5-percent and 1-percent, 
respectively. A constant term was also included (not reported). See Appendix Table 1 
for a full description of the data sources and variable definitions. 
  
Table 2. Explaining Productivity Levels Across U.S. States          
Dependent Variable: Log Price-Adjusted Income per Worker           
                 
Panel A: Core Model             Panel B: Additional Regressions for 1880 
                 
Independent Variable  1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980         
                 
Constant 6.106*** 6.182*** 7.306*** 7.046*** 8.549*** 9.717***   6.018*** 6.332*** 6.285*** 6.106***
 (0.075)  (0.059)  (0.049)  (0.059)  (0.042)  (0.056)   (0.070) (0.112) (0.049) (0.075) 
 [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]   [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
                 
Percentage of workforce   0.011** 0.008*  0.005*** 0.006* 0.001 0.002    0.016*** 0.015** 0.006 0.011** 
   in mining in 1880  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)   (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) 
 [0.039]  [0.058]  [0.001]  [0.068]  [0.633]  [0.351]   [0.004] [0.040] [0.185] [0.039] 
                 
Average number of cooling  -0.0001 0.003  0.002 0.002 0.005 0.007*      -0.027** -0.003 0.000 
   degree days (100's)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)      (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) 
 [0.979]  [0.460]  [0.446]  [0.567]  [0.139] [0.061]      [0.003] [0.498] [0.979] 
                 
Percentage of 1860 population   -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.006*** -0.003**       -0.017*** -0.019***
   in slavery  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)        (0.003) (0.002) 
 [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] [0.044]        [0.000] [0.000] 
                 
Access to ocean or Great  0.238*** 0.197*** 0.183*** 0.331*** 0.106*** 0.087**         0.238***
   Lakes  (0.072)  (0.063)  (0.052)  (0.050) (0.029) (0.039)          (0.072) 
 [0.002]  [0.003]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.001] [0.029]          [0.002] 
                 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.71  0.77  0.79  0.68 0.42 0.13    0.12 0.40 0.65 0.71 
Number  of  observations  47  48  48 48 48 48    47 47 47 47 
                 
Notes: White's consistent covariance estimator is used. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and p-values are shown in square 
Brackets. One, two, or three stars on a coefficient indicates significance at the 10-percent, 5-percent and 1-percent levels, respectively.  
See Appendix Table 1 for a full description of the data sources and variable definitions.              
 
Table 3. Sensitivity Tests for Climate        
Dependent Variable: Log Price-Adjusted Income per Worker         
        
  1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 
Cooling Degree Days (100's)  -0.008  -0.003  0.009  0.007  0.019*  0.017 
(with quadratic term included)  (0.019)  (0.017) (0.013) (0.014) (0.009)  (0.013) 
  [0.669] [0.861] [0.497] [0.595] [0.031]  [0.186] 
         
Cooling Degree Days Squared 
(100,000's) 0.002  0.001  -0.002 -0.001 -0.003  -0.002 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)  (0.003) 
  [0.645] [0.699] [0.553] [0.699] [0.123]  [0.433] 
         
Ice and Snowfall Accumulation (inches)  1.89E-04 3.04E-04 -1.17E-03 0.000 -0.001*  -0.002**
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) 
  [0.912] [0.840] [0.229] [0.770] [0.091]  [0.035] 
         
Minimum Temperature (days)  5.15E-05 5.82E-06 -0.001* -0.001  -0.001** -0.001***
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)  (0.000) 
  [0.950] [0.993] [0.099] [0.443] [0.036]  [0.004] 
         
Notes: This table reports the estimated coefficients for alternative specifications and measures of climate 
when they are substituted for the benchmark definition of climate (cooling degree days) used in table 2. The
first two rows show an alternative specification which includes a quadratic term, while the second two 
report coefficients using alternative measures emphasizing the effects of frost and freezing. White's 
consistent covariance estimator is used. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and p-values are shown
in square brackets. One, two, or three stars on a coefficient indicates significance at the10-percent, 
5-percent, and 1-percent levels, respectively. See Appendix Table 1 for a full description of the data 
sources and variable definitions. 
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Table 4. Sensitivity Tests for Access to Navigable Waterway     
           
  1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 
Access to ocean  0.173** 0.155** 0.178*** 0.293*** 0.075**  0.032 
 (0.069) (0.059) (0.044)  (0.056)  (0.036)  (0.042) 
 [0.016] [0.012] [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.045]  [0.456] 
            
Access to Great Lake  0.159** 0.124* 0.075  0.114  0.061* 0.108*** 
 (0.074) (0.067) (0.064)  (0.092)  (0.035)  (0.037) 
 [0.038] [0.072] [0.249]  [0.221]  [0.093]  [0.006] 
            
Access to River  0.011  -0.005 -0.040 -0.163** -0.030  0.021 
 (0.078) (0.065) (0.052)  (0.069)  (0.035)  (0.039) 
 [0.891] [0.934] [0.443]  [0.023]  [0.387]  [0.595] 
            
Access to ocean or River  0.127 0.095  0.086  0.093  0.006  0.011 
 (0.118) (0.069) (0.067)  (0.105)  (0.055)  (0.074) 
 [0.287] [0.175] [0.203]  [0.380]  [0.913]  [0.881] 
            
Access to Great Lake or River  0.061 0.027  0.001  -0.115  -0.004  0.059 
 (0.080) (0.064) (0.052)  (0.074)  (0.037)  (0.039) 
 [0.454] [0.668] [0.984]  [0.127]  [0.912]  [0.140] 
            
Access to ocean or Great Lake 0.1990 0.124  0.128  0.174  0.058  0.080 
or River  (0.136) (0.075) (0.076)  (0.107)  (0.053)  (0.080) 
 [0.149] [0.106] [0.102]  [0.112]  [0.275]  [0.325] 
            
Notes: This table reports the estimated coefficients for various measures of locational advantage  
when they are substituted for the benchmark definition used in table 2 for access to navigable  
waterways (by ocean or Great Lakes.) White's consistent covariance estimator is used. Standard  
errors are shown in parentheses and p-values are shown in square brackets. One, two, or three  
stars on a coefficient indicates significance at the 10-percent, 5-percent and 1-percent levels, 
respectively. See Appendix Table 1 for a full description of the data sources and variable 
definitions.  
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Table 5. Testing for the Impact of Slavery      
Dependent Variable: Log Price-Adjusted Income per Worker       
          
Panel A: Robustness test of legacy of slavery: substituting large plantation slave population 
          
Independent Variable  1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 
         
Constant  6.076*** 6.146*** 7.280*** 7.016*** 8.537*** 9.713***
  (0.077)  (0.061) (0.051) (0.060) (0.041) (0.057) 
 [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
         
Percentage of 1880 workforce   0.013**  0.011** 0.007** 0.007**  0.002  0.002 
   in mining  (0.005)  (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
 [0.012]  [0.017]  [0.000]  [0.019] [0.397] [0.249] 
         
Average number of cooling  -0.003  0.000 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.007* 
   degree days (100's)  (0.005)  (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
 [0.454]  [0.977]  [0.892]  [0.733] [0.146] [0.061] 
         
Percentage of 1860 population   -0.028*** -0.032*** -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.010*** -0.004* 
   in slavery on large    (0.005)  (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
   plantations  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.051] 
         
Access to ocean or Great  0.263*** 0.225*** 0.204*** 0.355*** 0.115*** 0.090** 
   Lakes  (0.071)  (0.065) (0.047) (0.053) (0.031) (0.041) 
 [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.000]  [0.000] [0.001] [0.032] 
         
Adjusted R-Squared  0.66  0.73 0.75 0.67 0.39 0.11 
Number of observations  47  48 48 48 48 48 
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Table 5. Testing for the Impact of Slavery      
Dependent Variable: Log Price-Adjusted Income per Worker     
          
Panel B: Specification test for the impact of slavery      
          
Independent Variable 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 
          
Constant 6.104*** 6.220*** 7.329*** 7.049*** 8.573***  9.741***
  (0.094) (0.069) (0.057) (0.066) (0.044) (0.065) 
  [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
          
Percentage of workforce 1880  0.012** 0.008* 0.005*** 0.006**  0.001  0.002 
   in mining  (0.006) (0.005) (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
  [0.045] [0.094]  [0.003] [0.050] [0.685] [0.340] 
          
Slave dummy times   0.153  0.435 0.624 1.055* 0.344 -0.005 
   percentage of workforce 1880 in  (0.793) (0.827) (0.576) (0.612) (0.256) (0.221) 
   mining  [0.848] [0.602]  [0.285]  [0.093]  [0.187]  [0.981] 
          
Average number of cooling   -0.002 0.000  0.001 0.000 0.004 0.005 
   degree days (100's)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
  [0.655] [0.974]  [0.728] [0.950] [0.271] [0.143] 
          
Slave dummy times average  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000* 0.000** 
   number of cooling degree  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
   days (100's)  [0.433] [0.199]  [0.337] [0.200] [0.057] [0.034] 
          
Percentage of 1860 population  -0.021** -0.031*** -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.013*** -0.007**
   in slavery  (0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) 
  [0.026] [0.001]  [0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.023] 
          
Access to ocean or Great  0.259*** 0.175** 0.161*** 0.334*** 0.089** 0.082 
   Lakes  (0.092) (0.076) (0.052)  (0.062)  (0.036)  (0.053) 
  [0.008] [0.027]  [0.003] [0.000] [0.017] [0.126] 
          
Slave dummy times access  -0.004 0.001  0.004 0.000 0.001 -0.002 
   to ocean or Great Lakes  (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
  [0.465] [0.820]  [0.143] [0.951] [0.427] [0.447] 
          
Adjusted R-Squared  0.69  0.77  0.79 0.68 0.43 0.15 
Number  of  observations  47  48  48 48 48 48 
          
Notes: White's consistent covariance estimator is used. Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses and p-values are shown in square brackets. One, two, or three stars on a  
coefficient indicates significance at the 10-percent, 5-percent and 1-percent levels, respectively. 
See Appendix Table 1 for a full description of the data sources and variable definitions. 
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Table 6. Impact of Slavery and Navigable River      
Dependent Variable: Log Price-Adjusted Income per Worker     
Panel A: The Impact of Slavery Omitting Navigable Water     
Independent Variable  1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 
          
Constant  6.285*** 6.330*** 7.445*** 7.295*** 8.629*** 9.783*** 
  (0.049)  (0.039)  (0.034) (0.059) (0.032) (0.038) 
 [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
          
Percentage of workforce   0.006 0.005  0.002  0.000  -0.001  0.000 
   in mining in 1880  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
 [0.185]  [0.203]  [0.144]  [0.954] [0.611] [0.998] 
          
Average number of cooling  -0.003 0.000  -0.001  -0.003  0.004  0.006* 
   degree days (100's)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
 [0.498]  [0.941]  [0.731]  [0.564] [0.198] [0.059] 
          
Percentage of 1860 population   -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.005***  -0.002* 
   in slavery  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
 [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.075] 
          
Adjusted R-Squared  0.65  0.74  0.72 0.44 0.31 0.04 
Number of observations  47  48  48  48  48  48 
           
Panel B: Test for Navigable River as a Proxy for Slavery     
Independent Variable  1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 
          
Constant  6.298*** 6.345*** 7.471*** 7.376*** 8.646*** 9.775*** 
  (0.126)  (0.119)  (0.081) (0.084) (0.039) (0.042) 
 [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
          
Percentage of workforce   0.016* 0.016*  0.009*  0.004  0.002  0.001 
   in mining in 1880  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
 [0.036]  [0.034]  [0.033]  [0.375] [0.395] [0.363] 
          
Average number of cooling  -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.019*** -0.017***  -0.004*  0.003 
   degree days (100's)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
 [0.003]  [0.004]  [0.002]  [0.003] [0.097] [0.139] 
          
Access to River  0.072  0.083 0.022 -0.109 -0.005 0.030 
  (0.090)  (0.091)  (0.067) (0.077) (0.039) (0.038) 
 [0.429]  [0.366]  [0.743]  [0.164] [0.899] [0.441] 
          
Adjusted R-Squared  0.39  0.38  0.36 0.26 0.01 0.01 
Number of observations  47  48  48  48  48  48 
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Table 7. Climate, Latitude, and Productivity        
            
The Relationship Between Latitude and Climate    
            
  Cooling Heating Sum of       
  Degree Degree Cooling  and  Minimum  
Correlation Matrix Days Days Heating  Days Snowfall Temperature Latitude
           
Cooling Degree Days  1.00           
Heating Degree Days  -0.84  1.00         
Sum of Cooling & Heating Days  -0.63  0.95  1.00       
Ice and Snowfall Accumulation  -0.72  0.87  0.84  1.00     
Minimum Temperature  -0.77  0.94  0.91  0.83  1.00   
Latitude -0.85  0.90  0.79  0.73  0.76  1.00 
            
Notes: See Appendix Table 1 for a full description of the data sources and variable definitions.    
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Table 8. Instrumental Variables Regressions         
Dependent Variable: Log Price-Adjusted Income per Worker        
             
            First-stage 
Independent Variable  1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980    Regression
            
Constant 6.152*** 6.200*** 7.336*** 7.092*** 8.598*** 9.766***    -14.911*** 
 (0.106) (0.076)  (0.045)  (0.068) (0.038) (0.045)    (4.902) 
 [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]    [0.004] 
            
Percentage of workforce   0.013** 0.009** 0.007*** 0.007**  0.003  0.003   -0.2345 
   in mining in 1880  (0.006) (0.004)  (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)    (0.202) 
 [0.027] [0.046]  [0.002]  [0.034] [0.231] [0.108]    [0.251] 
             
Average number of cooling  -0.008  0.000 -0.003 -0.005 -0.002 0.000    1.004*** 
   degree days (100's)  (0.010) (0.006)  (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)    (0.249) 
 [0.428] [0.996]  [0.476]  [0.464] [0.533] [0.964]    [0.000] 
            
Percentage of 1860 population   -0.013** -0.019*** -0.012*** -0.009* -0.001  0.003    
   in slavery  (0.006) (0.005)  (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)     
  [0.044] [0.000] [0.001] [0.080] [0.766] [0.342]     
             
Access to ocean or Great  0.197** 0.181** 0.156*** 0.287*** 0.060  0.042   3.678* 
   Lakes  (0.091) (0.081)  (0.045)  (0.059) (0.038) (0.043)    (1.506) 
 [0.037] [0.031]  [0.001]  [0.000] [0.124] [0.343]    [0.019] 
             
Soldier  Mortality            4.204*** 
            (1.561) 
            [0.010] 
             
Adjusted R-Squared  0.70  0.79  0.79 0.66 0.20 0.01    0.59 
Number of observations  47  48  48  48  48  48    48 
            
Notes: Soldier mortality is used as an instrumental variable for the percentage of 1860 population  
who were slaves. White's consistent covariance estimator is used. Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses and p-values are shown in square brackets. One, two, or three stars on a coefficient 
indicates significance at the 10-percent, 5-percent and 1-percent levels, respectively. See 
Appendix Table 1 for a full description of the data sources and variable definitions.   
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Table 9. The Impact of Settler Origins on GDP per Capita     
Dependent Variable: Log Price-Adjusted Income per Worker     
          
Independent Variable  1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 
          
Constant 5.978*** 6.095*** 7.330*** 7.123*** 8.536***  9.670*** 
  (0.127) (0.093) (0.075) (0.077)  (0.043)  (0.049) 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
          
Percentage of workforce   0.012** 0.009** 0.004** 0.004 0.000 0.001 
   in mining in 1880  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
  [0.019] [0.036] [0.010] [0.180] [0.855] [0.728] 
          
Average number of cooling  -0.001  0.002  0.001 0.000 0.003 0.005 
   degree days (100's)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
  [0.871] [0.653] [0.834] [0.922] [0.318] [0.119] 
          
Percentage of 1860 population   -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.006*** -0.003** 
   in slavery  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.030] 
          
Access to ocean or Great  0.275*** 0.228*** 0.161*** 0.273*** 0.109*** 0.111*** 
   Lakes  (0.084)  (0.067)  (0.049)  (0.051)  (0.032)  (0.039) 
  [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.000] [0.001] [0.006] 
          
French Settler  0.095  0.059  -0.042  -0.108*  -0.015  0.016 
  (0.084) (0.063) (0.048) (0.050)  (0.030)  (0.031) 
  [0.265] [0.351] [0.379] [0.038] [0.621] [0.599] 
          
Spanish  Settler  0.091 0.088 0.048 0.067  0.105***  0.130*** 
  (0.080) (0.067) (0.048) (0.054)  (0.027)  (0.032) 
  [0.261] [0.197] [0.321] [0.224] [0.000] [0.000] 
          
Dutch Settler  0.183** 0.109  0.086  0.152**  0.064  0.050 
  (0.090) (0.080) (0.068) (0.070)  (0.049)  (0.063) 
  [0.050] [0.182] [0.211] [0.036] [0.200] [0.426] 
          
Adjusted R-Squared  0.71  0.77  0.80 0.73 0.54 0.31 
Number of observations  47  48  48  48  48  48 
          
Notes: White's consistent covariance estimator is used. Standard errors are in parentheses  
and p-values are shown in square brackets. One, two, or three stars on a coefficient indicates 
significance at the 10-percent, 5-percent and 1-percent levels, respectively. Data on settlement
are based on Maddex (1998) and Cooke (1993). See Appendix Table 1 for a full description of 
the data sources and variable definitions.           
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Table 10. Testing the Reversal of Fortune Hypothesis     
          
Panel A: Dependent Variable, Log Price-Adjusted Income per Worker in 1980    
       Including Percent   
    Including Access to   Including  of workforce   Including Settler
Proxy for Labor Productivity  Constant only to Ocean or Great Lakes Minimum Temp in  Mining Origin  Dummies 
          
Price-adjusted income per   0.084** 0.088**  0.174*** 0.176***  0.171*** 
  Worker in 1880  (0.042)  (0.041)  (0.055)  (0.054)  (0.054) 
 [0.050]  [0.039]  [0.003]  [0.002]  [0.003] 
          
Population Density, 1700  -0.005***  -0.007*** -0.006***  -0.006***  -0.005** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
 [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.001]  [0.050] 
          
Population Density, 1770  -0.002**  -0.002*** -0.002***  -0.002**  -0.001 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
 [0.028]  [0.002]  [0.010]  [0.014]  [0.127] 
          
Adjusted R-Squared  .09/.04/.03 .14/.09/.09  .35/.12/.13 .35/.15/.15 .44/.29/.28 
Number of observations  47/48/48 47/48/48  47/48/48  47/48/48  47/48/48 
          
Panel B: Dependent Variable, Log Price-Adjusted Income per Worker in 1880    
          
Proxy for Labor Productivity          
          
Population Density, 1700  0.020***  0.023*** 0.015**  0.016**  0.025** 
 (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.010) 
 [0.006]  [0.011]  [0.047]  [0.027]  [0.017] 
          
Population Density, 1770  0.007*** 0.008***  0.006** 0.006** 0.009** 
 (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
 [0.004]  [0.008]  [0.036]  [0.018]  [0.011] 
          
Adjusted R-Squared  .04/.05  .06/.07 .33/.33  .46/.47  .54/.55 
Number of observations  47 47  47  47  47 
          
Notes: White's consistent covariance estimator is used. Standard errors are shown in parentheses    
and p-values are shown in square brackets. One, two, or three stars on a coefficient indicates   
significance at the 10-percent, 5-percent and 1-percent levels, respectively. Population density   
is computed as persons per square mile in 1700, and includes European settlers and indigenous   
populations. See Appendix Table 1 for a full description of the data sources and variable definitions.     
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Table 11. Urbanization, Labor Productivity, and Population Density     
          
  Pop. Density Pop. Density Pop. Density Pop. Density Pop. Density Pop. Density
Correlation Coefficient  1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 
            
Urbanization, 1880  0.8321           
Urbanization, 1900    0.7875         
Urbanization, 1920      0.7465       
Urbanization, 1940        0.7411     
Urbanization, 1960          0.5781   
Urbanization, 1980            0.4891 
            
Labor Productivity, 1880  0.2968           
Labor Productivity, 1900    0.23         
Labor Productivity, 1920      0.271       
Labor Productivity, 1940        0.41     
Labor Productivity, 1960          0.266   
Labor Productivity, 1980            0.067 
            
  Labor   Labor   Labor   Labor   Labor   Labor  
 Productivity  Productivity  Productivity Productivity  Productivity Productivity
 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 
            
Urbanization, 1880  0.6563           
Urbanization, 1900    0.6155         
Urbanization, 1920      0.6477       
Urbanization, 1940        0.77     
Urbanization, 1960          0.7817   
Urbanization, 1980            0.677 
            
Population Density 1700  0.2076          -0.1886 
Population Density 1770  0.2265          -0.1801 
            
            
Notes: Urbanization is the fraction of a state's population that is resides in municipalities with populations greater 
than 2,500 persons. Population density is computed as persons per square mile, and for 1700 and 1770, 
Includes both European settlers and indigenous populations. Labor Productivity is log price-adjusted income 
per worker. See Appendix Table 1 for a full description of the data sources and variable definitions.  
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Figure 1.Price-adjusted state income per worker
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Appendix Table 1.  Data Description and Sources 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Labor productivity (price-adjusted personal income per worker):   
 
Personal income per capita in each state has been adjusted for the variation in price levels across states in each of 
1880, 1900, 1920, 1940, 1960 and 1980. Due to limitations of the available data, this adjustment cannot be made 
across these years, and hence to a common base year (thus accounting for our use of the term ‘price-adjusted’ rather 
than ‘deflated’ or ‘real’). The price-adjusted per capita income is then converted to a per worker basis (that is, 
allowing for variation across states in the age distribution and workforce participation rates of both males and 
females). The resulting series is therefore a measure of average labor productivity in each state and year rather than 
a measure of real gross state product per capita. A full description of the sources and estimation methods employed 
is provided in Mitchener and McLean (1999). 
 
Percentage of the workforce employed in mining in 1880: 
 




Climate and temperature data are based on a standard 30-year period from 1961 through 1990. The average number 
of cooling degree days is computed as the number of days in which the average air temperature rose above 65 
degrees F times the number of degrees on those days which the average daily air temperature exceeded 65 over the 
year. The average number of heating degree days is computed as the number of days in which the average air 
temperature was below 65 degrees F times the number of degrees on those days which the average daily air 
temperature was below 65. The sum of cooling and heating days is the sum of these two series. For all three series, 
the data reported in 100s of degree days. Minimum temperature is the average number of days per year where the 
average temperature is 32F or less. Ice and snowfall accumulation is the average total inches of snow and ice pellets 
per year (trace accumulations are counted as zero). Data for U.S. cities are used to compute state averages and are 
from the Statistical Abstract of the United States (1992, pp.226-9). In states where multiple cities were listed, the 




Latitude is measured as degrees from the equator, and is taken relative to the state’s largest city. The measure can 
vary slightly over our 6 periods as a result of changes in the largest city for a given state.  Data are from Rand 
McNally World Atlas. State “centroid” data from the National Center for Geographic Information and Analysis 
(ftp://ncgia.ucsb.edu/publications/tech_reports/95/95-6/data) were used as an alternative measure, and yielded 
similar results to those reported in the tables. 
 
Percentage of 1860 population in slavery, and in slavery on large plantations: 
 
Respectively, these are defined as the total number of slaves as a percentage of the total population of each state in 
1860 and the number of slaves owned by slaveholders having more than 20 slaves as a percentage of the total 
population of each state in 1860. Data on the total number of slaves and the number of slaves per slaveholder were 
obtained from census returns in Agriculture of the United States in 1860: The Eighth Census (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1864), p.247. 
 
Access to ocean/Great Lakes/river: 
 
An indicator variable takes the value of one if a state borders the ocean/Great Lake/river, and zero if it does not. 
Various combinations of these three forms of access to navigable water are used. The data on states with access to 
navigable rivers were kindly provided by Andrew Mellinger of the Center for International Development at Harvard 
University. 
   60
Soldier Mortality: 
 
Soldier mortality rates at the state level are calculated as percentages. They are derived using U.S. soldier mortality 
data for individual forts as reported in Lawson (1840, 1856). Quarterly data were collected by the U.S. Surgeon 
General and Adjutant General’s Offices for 1829-38 and by the U.S. Surgeon General’s Office for 1839-54. Yearly 
mortality rates for each fort are computed by dividing the number of deaths each year by the average, annual “mean 
strength” of soldiers. Mean strength represents the population of soldiers stationed at a fort. (We exclude cholera 
outbreaks that swept through Europe and the US in the 19
th century since prevention of the spread of the disease 
was a matter of sanitation and unrelated to the climatic environment). The annual estimates are then averaged using 
all existing data for a state. In states where more than one fort was located, the arithmetic mean of the forts located 
in that state are used to compute state mortality. If a state had no forts (15 for the 1839-54 period), the average of 
bordering states within a similar climatic zone (based on rainfall, snow accumulation, mean temperature, and 
minimum temperature) was used as the state’s mortality figure. For the 1829-38 period, Lawson reports two sets of 
records on deaths, the adjutant general’s and medical returns; we computed mortality figures using both data sets. In 
table 5, we report the results using medical returns since this is what is used for the 1839-54 period and because this 
series excludes deaths from accidental causes or detachments. If the adjutant general’s series is used instead, the 
results do not differ significantly from those reported in table 5.  
 
Christian Sects Tolerant of Slavery: 
 
This is computed as the percentage of Christian churches in a state in 1790 that were more tolerant of slavery. The 
term church is defined in the data as a congregation of people who meet periodically for religious services. The 
maximum interval between meetings is generally no more than several months. Itinerant ministries or temporary 
ones are not included in these figures. The meeting place may be a building, although the definition does not make 
the structure the emphasis, but rather the act of meeting regularly. Data on churches are from Paullin (1932, plate 
80). The classification of Christian sects as tolerant of slavery is based on Hall (1930) and Steckel (2000).  
 
Colonial origin of state: 
 
A series of indicator variables which take on positive values if a state, prior to statehood, had ties with that colonial 
power (except England, which is the omitted country). Data are based on Maddex (1998) and Cooke (1993). 
 
Population Density Estimates for the Colonial Period, 1700 and 1770: 
 
There is a long and contentious debate among anthropologists, historians, demographers, and ethnologists 
concerning the population of Native Americans or North American Indians at the time of European contact. The 
estimates vary enormously, ranging from as little as 1 million to as much as 17 million for all of North America (See 
John D. Daniels (1992) for a discussion). To a large extent, the imprecise measurement reflects a lack of historical 
evidence: none of the American Indians at the time of European contact kept written records, so researchers rely on 
incomplete and often inaccurate accounts of contemporary Europeans. Consequently, there is no single, agreed upon 
methodology for estimating tribal populations when the records are defective or lacking specificity. Moreover, the 
precise impact of European diseases on the native population are unknown, and differences in opinion concerning 
the epidemiological impact invite widely different “corrections” to population estimates.  
 
The lack of scholarly agreement on the indigenous population at the time of European contact and the subsequent 
effects of disease pose a serious impediment for estimating population density by state in 1700, a time at which 
European settlers were living alongside Native Americans. The debate over which numbers to use is simplified by 
the fact that few scholars have actually published tribal-level estimates of Native American populations. In fact, 
despite their limitations, Mooney’s (1928) estimates are still the most complete and detailed tribal estimates 
published, and many scholars have used his work as a starting point for their estimates. Using revised tribal 
estimates that are part of a massive, but still unfinished, scholarly undertaking entitled the Handbook of North 
American Indians (edited by Sturtevant, (1978-)), Ubelaker (1988) has revised Mooney’s estimates and reported 
them on a regional basis. Unfortunately, he has not provided these data on a more disaggregate level.  
 
The tribe-based estimates of Mooney, Ubelaker, and others in their scholarly tradition tend to be on the low range of   61
the figures reported above, but for our purposes this is unimportant. Our objective is not to measure accurately the 
total population of Native Americans in the entire United States, but to estimate the relative populations within each 
future state, so that population density in 1700 can be calculated. We therefore make an important simplifying 
assumption so that we can use tribal-based estimates of Native Americans as a starting point for calculating 
population density in 1700. We assume that European diseases had an approximately equal impact on tribal 
populations, so that the relative sizes of tribes are left unaffected. Clearly, this is a strong assumption, but will have 
to suffice until epidemiological evidence is translated to individual tribal population counts. Tribal populations and 
locations of tribes at the time of European contact are obtained from the series edited by Sturtevant (1978-). To date, 
this source lacks detailed information on the Southeast region, so we obtained estimates from Malinowski (1998). 
The tribal population counts were then aggregated to a state level based on the maps shown in Sturtevant (1978-). 
When tribes spanned multiple states, they were assigned fractions based on the percentage of their range within a 
state or based on more detailed historical information provided in Sturtevant (1978-) about where the population 
resided. These estimates were then aggregated to a regional level and compared to Ubelaker’s estimates. Ubelaker’s 
figures include tribes in Mexico and Canada, but after adjusting for this difference, the figures were fairly similar. 
Our aggregate estimate of Native American population at the time of contact lies between the Mooney and Ubelaker 
estimates. Since European contact with specific North American tribes actually spanned centuries, we make the 
assumption that there was little population growth for indigenous populations prior to contact. This allows us to use 
the population figure at the time of contact and apply it to 1700.  
 
We calculated population density (persons per square mile) by summing the estimates of Native Americans with 
those for European settlers and free and slave black populations and dividing the total by the area figures from the 
Statistical Abstract of the United States (1992, table 340, p.205). Population of European colonists and blacks by 
state are from U.S. Department of Commerce (1975, table Z1-19), McCusker and Menard (1985, p.136) for 
Maryland and Virginia, and U.S. Department of Commerce (1909, p.9) for imputed estimates of New Hampshire 
and Maine. We consider two dates, 1700 and 1770, reflecting the growth of European settlers in the 18
th century; 
however, because our figures for Native Americans only approximate the populations at the time of European 
contact, we use the same figure for this portion of a state’s population at both dates.  
 
Urbanization and Population Density, 1880 to 1980: 
 
Urbanization is the fraction of a state’s population residing in urban areas. Urban areas are defined by the U.S. 
Census as those places containing more than 2,500 persons. Population density is thousands of  persons per square 
mile for 1880 to 1980. Data on urbanization are from U.S. Department of Commerce (1975, Series A202) and the 
Statistical Abstract of the United States (1985, table 12, p.12). Data on population density are computed using state 
population data from U.S. Department of Commerce (1975, Series A7 and A195) and the Statistical Abstract of the 
United States (1992, table 25, p.22), and state area data from the Statistical Abstract of the United States (1992, 













































1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980
AL 214.1 212.5 796.9 785.0 4854.2 18835.8 0.3 2627 45.1 O 28.4 8.0 F,S 3.4
AZ 650.1 689.8 1747.5 1331.3 5553.0 19744.2 30.0 4162 0.0 - 0.0 73.0 S 1.8
AR 241.0 235.6 927.4 748.5 4621.9 17768.4 0.0 2005 25.5 R 13.2 42.0 F,S 3.4
CA 777.1 754.9 2223.0 1846.1 6652.5 22471.8 13.1 773 0.0 O,R 0.0 87.0 S 3.1
CO 638.6 733.5 1817.6 1389.3 6312.9 19633.4 32.2 679 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 F,S 1.9
CT 638.4 604.7 1727.4 1942.7 6557.0 19494.3 0.7 677 0.0 O 0.0 0.0 E 1.0
DE 566.0 589.9 1794.1 2309.3 6881.6 18761.8 0.4 1046 1.6 O 0.0 0.0 E,D 3.0
FL 218.8 269.1 1040.5 1221.0 5821.3 23734.1 0.0 3375 44.1 O 25.6 10.0 E,S 3.2
GA 213.5 206.8 857.2 861.8 4868.3 18802.0 0.1 1667 43.7 O 24.1 14.0 E,S 3.7
ID 474.9 479.4 1771.8 1270.7 4952.6 17810.0 38.5 754 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 E 1.6
IL 669.6 729.2 2042.1 1746.2 6342.8 21513.9 1.7 867 0.0 L,R 0.0 0.0 E,F 1.3
IN 498.4 545.5 1610.2 1456.3 5511.0 18388.1 0.8 1014 0.0 L,R 0.0 0.0 E,F 2.1
IA 565.0 625.4 1585.7 1300.4 5428.6 18623.1 0.9 1036 0.0 R 0.0 0.0 E,F 1.1
KS 362.5 530.8 1670.8 1138.1 5850.3 19314.5 1.2 1628 0.0 R 0.0 0.0 E,F 1.6
KY 382.6 382.0 1117.6 891.2 4926.4 17235.7 0.6 1288 19.5 R 3.8 0.0 F 4.1
LA 362.7 331.9 1283.6 1026.8 5641.1 21362.0 0.0 2655 46.9 O,R 33.9 49.0 F,S 4.1
ME 413.1 464.5 1558.5 1361.3 4761.6 14880.0 0.6 268 0.0 O 0.0 0.0 E,F 1.4
MD 536.1 559.9 1809.2 1618.2 5820.8 18044.7 1.5 1137 13.2 O 4.2 0.0 E 2.1
MA 693.1 677.6 1891.2 1743.2 5746.2 17665.2 0.2 678 0.0 O 0.0 0.0 E 1.0
MI 536.2 528.0 1641.0 1631.8 6610.3 21355.5 1.6 379 0.0 L 0.0 0.0 E,F 1.1
MN 590.2 619.9 1522.0 1280.9 5500.0 18563.6 0.0 431 0.0 L,R 0.0 0.0 E,F,S 0.9
MS 239.2 213.8 686.9 570.0 3911.2 16516.2 0.0 2215 55.2 O,R 36.3 40.0 E,F 4.0
MO 531.8 565.3 1513.3 1292.5 5738.8 19831.7 0.9 1411 9.7 R 1.2 56.0 F,S 4.1
MT 647.9 738.7 1643.2 1384.2 5369.4 17810.2 27.8 388 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 E,F,S 1.2
NE 483.0 632.9 1585.2 1155.1 5627.2 18266.4 0.1 1072 0.1 R 0.0 0.0 F,S 1.1
NV 1034.6 776.8 1976.0 2011.9 6233.7 20390.3 28.6 508 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 S 2.1
NH 482.9 494.0 1478.9 1412.4 5047.8 15840.5 0.2 328 0.0 O 0.0 0.0 E 1.1
NJ 699.5 668.2 2015.6 1818.1 6499.3 20838.7 1.3 826 0.0 O 0.0 0.0 E,D 2.4
NM 275.8 408.7 1370.5 1075.1 6063.1 18382.7 6.6 1244 0.0 - 0.0 64.0 S 2.4
NY 750.7 778.5 2438.5 1922.8 6177.8 21165.7 0.3 693 0.0 O,L 0.0 0.0 E,D 1.7
NC 183.3 182.0 984.0 823.7 4287.2 14360.2 0.2 1500 33.3 O 15.9 12.0 E 2.5
ND 448.9 536.5 1441.7 930.8 4912.6 15416.5 0.6 488 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 F 1.1
OH 593.4 624.8 1842.0 1619.6 6226.2 20167.1 0.8 805 0.0 L,R 0.0 0.0 E,F 2.3
OK - 317.7 1407.2 1040.7 5819.4 21609.7 1.9 1859 0.0 R 0.0 64.0 F,S 2.8
OR 550.5 570.0 1920.4 1507.3 5749.6 19183.8 7.1 371 0.0 O,R 0.0 0.0 F 1.6
PA 644.2 635.2 1953.8 1623.3 6030.9 20808.6 7.3 878 0.0 L 0.0 0.0 E,D 1.7
RI 622.4 617.6 1745.2 1582.6 5043.3 15827.3 0.2 606 0.0 O 0.0 0.0 E 0.9
SC 190.6 176.4 805.7 803.9 4227.2 17533.2 0.1 1966 57.2 O 37.9 6.0 E 2.6
SD 433.9 559.8 1596.5 934.6 4920.3 14964.9 14.0 744 0.0 R 0.0 0.0 F 1.0
TN 285.9 284.3 1000.1 904.0 4520.0 17515.9 0.4 1867 24.8 R 8.9 19.0 E,F 3.4
TX 289.0 389.6 1371.3 1086.3 5743.5 21794.1 0.0 2466 30.2 O 13.0 58.0 S 4.0
UT 431.8 558.9 1629.5 1397.2 5812.7 17907.1 9.5 1047 0.1 - 0.0 0.0 S 2.1
VT 442.1 454.3 1413.4 1293.1 4775.9 14329.3 1.6 388 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 E,F,D 1.1
VA 248.8 286.8 1132.6 1150.5 5021.3 17526.5 0.4 1385 38.7 O 19.4 1.0 E 2.2
WA 500.2 606.6 1896.6 1545.8 6039.3 21077.3 4.0 294 0.0 O,R 0.0 0.0 E,S 1.6
WV 337.8 363.4 1535.5 1171.2 5146.3 17352.4 2.7 1031 4.9 R 2.3 0.0 E 2.5
WI 508.1 523.7 1537.4 1345.4 5511.9 18257.5 0.4 479 0.0 L,R 0.0 0.0 E,F 1.2
WY 638.3 574.7 2093.6 1430.5 5886.5 22184.2 4.5 285 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 F,S 1.1
Labour Productivity (Price-adjusted income per worker) 63
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